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Abstract—Prior work has shown that uncontrolled mes-
saging in ad-hoc opportunistic networks results in a dispro-
portionate sharing of network capacity. Solutions based on
publicly verifiable sender authentication mechanisms, such as
those in [1], require complete message transmission for proper
verification. However, introducing message fragmentation, e.g.,
to optimize limited transmission opportunities, could negatively
impact resource management. Unverifiable message fragments
that are assigned lower priorities are discarded sooner and
reduce delivery ratios. This paper investigates the extent
of this impact and shows that publicly verifiable fragment
authentication mechanisms are needed to retain the benefits
of fragmentation as well as resource management.
We take this a step further and show through simulations
that strong authenticity guarantees for intermediaries are
unnecessary in our specific scenario. Best-effort authentication
schemes, where the probability of false positives is much higher
than in typical authentication schemes, are sufficient. This
suggests the existence of other scenarios where this approach is
also applicable. We describe various best-effort authentication
techniques and analyze their computation and space savings.
Keywords-best-effort security; opportunistic networks; frag-
ment authentication
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Uncontrolled messaging by resource hogs results in dis-
proportionate allocation of the network resources required
to serve those nodes. Even a small number of hogs greatly
reduces message delivery ratios for the remaining users [1].
However, this can be controlled through resource manage-
ment schemes: Nodes group themselves into cooperative
domains that prioritize incoming messages based on sender
authentication. Messages sourced from fellow domain mem-
bers are given higher priority [1].
Research has shown that message fragmentation can
improve delivery ratios in opportunistic networks through
better utilization of available contact opportunities [2]. Frag-
mentation in the presence of resource hogs implies the need
for publicly verifiable fragment authentication. Without frag-
ment authentication, intermediaries assign fragments (even
from a valid a domain member) the lowest priority. The end
result is lower delivery ratios.
Fragment authentication has not been widely addressed
in opportunistic networks (see [3]). Very strong authenticity
guarantees — i.e. limiting false positive (impersonation)
probabilities to less than 2−80 [4] — may not be needed in
our application scenario. We thus began with the conjecture
that a small number of false positives will not significantly
impact overall delivery ratios of domain members.
We investigate best-effort authentication where the prob-
ability of false positives is allowed to be much higher than
in typical authentication schemes. This allows a trade-off
between degree of authenticity for reduced transmission and
computation overhead. The caveat with applying best-effort
authentication is that a technique fit for one scenario may
be unfit for another.
Motivated by these concerns, we raise the following
questions:
1) How seriously does a lack of fragment authentication
impact the effectiveness of resource management tech-
niques against resource hogs?
2) To what extent can the benefits of resource manage-
ment techniques be retained with best-effort authenti-
cation?
3) What are the overhead costs incurred by full and best-
effort fragment authentication schemes?
To investigate these questions we extended the environ-
ment simulated in [1] to support fragmentation. We con-
firmed that resource management schemes are negatively im-
pacted when intermediaries are unable to verify fragmented
messages. We also learned that our target network scenario
can operate using best-effort authentication techniques with
false positive rates as high as 60%. Although this parameter
is ultimately under the control of the network operators,
we assume 60% is a reasonable level for our particular
scenario. Finally, we describe two additional techniques for
implementing best-effort fragment authentication, analyze
computational and space overhead, and present an informal
security analysis.
II. OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORKS AND FRAGMENTATION
A. Fragmentation in brief
The DTN architecture RFC [5] describes two methods
for message fragmentation in opportunistic networks: pro-
active and reactive. Proactive fragmentation occurs (only)
at the source node prior to message transmission. Reactive
fragmentation occurs immediately after a transmission link
on the message path is interrupted. The receiving node
constructs a new partial message from all received data,
while the sender retains the full message.
Our investigations focus on the second method due to
its general applicability and exhibited performance gains
in [2]. In particular, we focus on a variant of reactive
fragmentation where messages are fragmented at sender-
defined boundaries. We use the term scrap to refer to the
smallest authenticatable unit implied by fragment authen-
tication schemes, e.g., “toilet-paper” [6] or Merkle hash
tree [7]. (Those schemes are described towards the end of
Section II-C.) With this approach, new partial fragments are
only created from complete scraps received.
B. Simulated Environments
The environment of [1] was extended to support frag-
mentation and best-effort authentication. Parameters were
selected to simulate a mobile ad-hoc DTN scenario where
people travel throughout city streets using their personal
devices to exchange photographs and short videos.
• Node Hardware: Nodes communicate over 2 Mbit/s bi-
directional wireless links with messages generated at a
rate of one message per node per hour. Message source
and destination are selected uniformly at random while
the message size distribution varies with each mobility
model (see below).
• Routing Algorithm: The binary mode version of Spray-
and-Wait [8], with 10 message copies, was selected
as the primary routing algorithm because it exhibited
the highest delivery ratios while being most impacted
by resource hogs. In binary mode, half of available
message copies are transferred to the next hop until
a single copy remains. At this point, nodes revert to
direct-delivery mode.
• Domain Settings: Nodes are divided into two disjoint
groups: those that belong to a co-operative domain and
those that fall outside that domain. The former contains
90% of the total network while the outsider domain
contains the remaining 10%. Domain members cooper-
ate to increase their delivery ratios by prioritizing fel-
low domain-member messages. For instance, outsider
messages are the first to be discarded when allocating
new storage space. Outsiders are uncooperative and
handle all messages with equal priority.
We investigated two synthetic mobility models and one
real-world trace model corresponding to different contact
patterns. Certain parameters, e.g., message size distribution
and network load, varied between the models as follows:
• Random Waypoint(RWP): The simplest mobility model
restricts movements to an area of 1km×1km. Points
are selected uniformly at random and nodes behave as
described in the general synthetic parameters described
in Section II-B.
• Map-Based: The map-based mobility model restricts
movement to existing roads, highways, and pedestrian
paths in the downtown area of Helsinki, Finland. Des-
tination points are selected uniformly at random with
a bias towards several points of interest, e.g., movie
theaters and metro stations.
In the synthetic models above, a total of 250 nodes move
at a speed selected uniformly at random between 0.5-1.5
m/s. Upon reaching the destination a node pauses for 0-
120 seconds (randomly selected) before continuing. Message
sizes are distributed uniformly at random between 500KB-
5MB with a time-to-live of two hours. Message generation
is restricted to the first ten (out of twelve) hours. This gives
all messages an opportunity to traverse the network.
• RollerNet Trace: RollerNet traces are real-world con-
tact patterns extracted from an experiment conducted by
Tournoux, et al [9]. A total of 62 skaters in the Paris
roller tour were given Bluetooth equipped iMotes [10]
to record opportunistic sightings of neighboring Blue-
tooth devices.
Although over 1,000 unique devices were recorded, many
were only seen in passing. Our simulations only consider
the 517 devices seen more than once. We also mention that
trace data only includes devices directly seen by the iMotes.
It does not include contact opportunities between the other
devices. Instead of inferring contacts, we use the trace data
as provided and restrict message generation to the first 62
nodes. The remaining nodes act as gateways that receive and
forward data.
The RollerNet tour lasted three hours and is much shorter
than the 12 hour duration used in the synthetic traces. In
order to see the same effects of fragmentation and resource
hogs we changed message size range to 10MB-15MB and
increased the storage buffer to 100MB.
C. Simulation Results
Impact of Fragmentation: The first set of simulations,
summarized in Table I, show how fragmentation improves
delivery ratios, when all nodes are honest. Those improve-
ments, are due to better utilization of contact opportunities,
and mirror the results in [2].
Mobility Fragmentationa
Model No Yes
Map-Based .306 [.006] .567 [.009]
RWP .261 [.004] .487 [.015]
RollerNet .340 [.003] .518 [.001]
aStandard deviation in [ ]
Table I
FRAGMENTATION IMPROVES MESSAGE DELIVERY RATIOS
Resource Management Schemes: We now investigate the
effect of resource hogs and see if the coarse-grained resource
management of [1] improves delivery ratios.
In coarse-grained resource management, nodes group
themselves into domains and give priority to other domain
members. Nodes discard messages to make space for incom-
ing messages only when the buffer is currently full. Domain
members attempt to discard all low priority (non-domain)
messages before high priority messages. If only high priority
messages remain then the oldest message is discarded first.
Table II shows resource management schemes restoring
delivery ratios – cooperating domain members protect their
messages from resource hogs with high messaging rates.
No hogs
10% hogs
Mobility Resource Management
Model No Yes
Map-Based .306 [.006] .262 [.005] .288 [.010]
RWP .261 [.004] .230 [.006] .251 [.004]
RollerNet .340 [.003] .302 [.023] .329 [.014]
Table II
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COUNTERS RESOURCE HOGS AND IMPROVES
DELIVERY RATIOS
Fragment Authentication and Resource Management: We
now investigate the effect of fragmentation when combined
with resource management schemes based on full message
authentication. Table III shows that delivery ratios are similar
when hogs are not present. There is a slight improvement,
however, in delivery ratios from Table I. This is a result of
resource management: fragments of domain members and
all messages (fragmented or not) from outsiders are assigned
lower priority by intermediaries. The increased delivery ratio
for domain members is at the expense of a decreased ratio
for outsiders.
When resource hogs are introduced the increased con-
gestion causes more of the domain member’s fragments to
be discarded; and the delivery ratio r drops in all mobility
models.
We conclude that a lack of fragment authentication
severely reduces the effectiveness of resource management
schemes. Still, when we compare Table I and Table III,
we see r is better in this scenario than when there is no
fragmentation at all.
Mobility No Hogs 10% HogsModel
Map-Based .575 [.013] .397 [.006]
RWP .500 [.004] .319 [.004]
RollerNet .569 [.001] .452 [.014]
Table III
FRAGMENTATION COMBINED WITH RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LACKING
FRAGMENT AUTHENTICATION IS HARMFUL WITH 10% HOGS
If we add fragment authentication to the resource manage-
ment schemes we can restore delivery ratios to the baseline
case when no resource hogs are present (Table IV, right data
column). This is a direct result of intermediaries once again
correctly prioritizing messages from domain members. We
conclude that fragmentation must be coupled with fragment
authentication. This approach optimizes transmission oppor-
tunities while simultaneously protecting network resources.
10% hogs
Mobility Fragment Authentication
Model No Yes
Map-Based .397 [.006] .468 [.009]
RWP .319 [.004] .373 [.006]
RollerNet .452 [.014] .440 [.020]
Table IV
ADDING FRAGMENT AUTHENTICATION RESTORES MESSAGE DELIVERY
RATIOS
In all of the above scenarios we modeled fragment au-
thentication with strong, i.e., cryptographic, security guar-
antees. But strong security guarantees may not be required
for our specific application scenario. It is possible that
authentication mechanisms, with weaker levels of security,
are sufficient and can retain the benefits gained by resource
management techniques. In the next section we extend our
initial results by investigating best-effort authentication.
III. BEST-EFFORT AUTHENTICATION
Intuitively, a best-effort fragment authentication scheme
guarantees authenticity of a fragment with a certain prob-
ability: valid fragments are guaranteed to be verified (i.e.,
no false negatives). An invalid fragment may, however, be
verified with probability p (resulting in a false positive). We
reason that dropping a valid fragment is more harmful than
carrying an invalid fragment. The prior case results in being
unable to reconstruct a message while the latter increases
reconstruction effort for the destination node; that node must
determine which fragments are valid. In essence, a few false
positives are acceptable, while false negatives are not.
We emphasize here that best-effort authentication is only
intended for resource management in intermediaries. It does
not replace traditional end-to-end message integrity schemes.
Best-effort authentication, when used in conjunction with
a traditional end-to-end integrity scheme, does not affect
original message integrity.
A. Best-Effort Resource Management
We now investigate the effect of best-effort fragment
authentication in restoring delivery ratios in the presence
of resource hogs. To understand the effectiveness of the
approach, we focus on normalized delivery ratios (rˆ). These
ratios are normalized with respect to the case where frag-
mentation is used but no hogs are present (right data column
of Table I).
Fragment authentication is modeled as a generic algorithm
that accepts invalid fragments with a certain (false-positive)
probability rate p varied in increments of 0.2 between zero
and one. We assume that p is a fixed system-wide parameter
and comment that our goal is to study the effects of best-
effort authentication. Although other strategies are possible,
e.g., p values that vary per node, we have not studied the
implications of such approaches.
Figure 1 shows the delivery ratios against varying p values
for the random waypoint model, map-based mobility model,
and RollerNet traces. In each case we assume that 10% of the
nodes are resource hogs and keep the remaining parameters
unchanged. Note that p = 0 corresponds to using strong-
authentication and can also be mapped directly to the values
in the right column of Table IV. This difference illustrates
the effectiveness of resource management schemes.
Figure 1. Impact of best-effort authentication on delivery ratios
In each scenario we see false-positive rate increase to as
much as p = 0.6, with minor impact to rˆ. At p = 0.8, we
see a larger, possibly still acceptable, decrease. At p = 1,
corresponding to no authentication, we once again see the
negative impact caused by resource hogs. Equipped with
concrete values for p, we can construct a simple best-
effort authentication scheme with p as a fixed system-wide
parameter known to all domain members.
B. Spot-Checking
The simplest construction involves taking an existing
strong authentication scheme and performing verification
with probability 1−p. The actual false positive rate depends
on the overall load imposed by the resource hogs. For
instance, if half of all bundles seen by an intermediary node
with p = 0.2 are from resource hogs then the false positive
rate is 0.5× 0.8 = 0.4.
Using the same approach with fragment verification, an
intermediary verifies only a subset of received fragments
without harming the overall network. Spot-checking is sim-
ple, easily mapped to the graphs in III-A, and reduces
processing overhead for intermediaries. However, it does not
reduce transmission or storage overhead.
C. Formal Definition
A best-effort fragment authentication scheme is a tuple
of algorithms:
KeyGen(k)
The key generation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm
that computes a public-private key pair: (pksign, sksign)←
1k, where k is the security parameter of the system. This
key provides the strong end-to-end message authenticity and
integrity. A suitable k value provides a cryptographic level
of security.
Sign(M, sksign, IV )
Takes an input message M = s1|s2|...|sn, where si is an
individual scrap, a private signing key sksign, an optional
initialization vector(IV ), and produces a signature:
(σs, σbe, AUX)← SIGN(M, sksign, IV ),
where σs is the output of any cryptographically secure
signature scheme, e.g., DSA or RSA, over the whole mes-
sage and σbe is a secure signature over the vector AUX .
AUX =< aux1, aux2, ..., auxn > represents auxiliary data
for individual scrap verification.
Verify(M,pksign, σs)
A deterministic algorithm, that given an input message M ,
public signature verification key pksign, and possibly valid
signature σs
V ERIFY (M,pksign, σs)→ {TRUE,FALSE},
outputs true if σs is a valid signature on M and false
otherwise.
VerifyScrap(si, pksign, σbe, AUX)
A probabilistic algorithm, that given an input scrap si, public
signing key pksign, valid signature σbe, and auxiliary vector
AUX:
V RFY SCRAPp(si, pksign, σbe, AUX) → {TRUE,FALSE},
always outputs true if scrap si is part of the original
message M and true with probability p if it is not. i.e, this
construction allows for the possibility of false positives but
not false negatives. Note that if p = 0 we have a traditional
strong fragment authentication scheme.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS
A. Bloom Filter Overview
Bloom filters are probabilistic data structures used for
determining set membership. The data structure is a bit array
of size m with all bits initially set to zero. An element of
a set is added to the data structure by feeding that element
to k hash functions. Each function outputs a position in the
bit array, which is then set to one. Elements mapping to the
same index do not toggle the bit value, i.e., bits remain set.
Given a Bloom filter corresponding to set S, we can test
the status of an element by executingH() and checking if the
correct bit is set. False positives are introduced whenever a
hash function collision occurs and non-elements mapping to
a bit that has been set. To reduce this chance we can increase
m or the number of hash functions to k and require that all k
bits be set. We illustrate this concept with a simple example
in Figure 2. A small set S uses k = 2 hash functions to
create a Bloom filter.
Figure 2. Bloom filter example [k=2]
Bloom filters offer a trade-off between space, computa-
tion, and false-positive probability: increasing m decreases
the false-positive probability, but also increases storage and
transmission requirements. Similarly, increasing the number
k of hash functions decreases false-positive probability at
the expense of increased computational costs.
B. Best-effort Bloom Filter
We define a best-effort authentication based on Bloom
filters as follows:
Algorithm 1 Bloom Filter: Sign
SIGN(M, sksign,⊥) :
BF ← GenerateBloomFilter(M,m, k)
AUX ← BF
σs ← Ssksign(M)
σbe ← Ssksign(BF )
return (σs, σbe, AUX)
Algorithm 2 Bloom-Filter: Verify Scrap
V RFY SCRAP (si, pksign, σbe, AUX) :
BF ← AUX
if V ERIFY (SIG, pksign, σbe) == false then
return false
else
return TestMembership(BF, si)
end if
The above algorithms make use of two helper functions.
GenerateBloomFilter(M,m, k) takes the scraps of a mes-
sage M and generates the corresponding Bloom filter of size
m with k hash functions using the process described earlier.
The TestMembership(BF, si) takes an input scrap si and
checks if the corresponding bits of the k hash functions are
set. If all bits are set the method returns true otherwise
false. Note that this method, with its intrinsic possibility
for false positives, make this a best-effort technique.
C. Single-ply Toilet Paper Approach with Truncated Hashes
Using cryptographic hash functions with low output en-
tropy, i.e., limited range size, is considered undesirable
for most applications. This decreases the amount of work
needed to find collisions or perform pre-image attacks.
However, this turns out to be useful for our target scenario:
small hash sizes save on bandwidth and transmission over-
head. Reducing the size of auxiliary fragment authentication
information optimizes the use of limited communication
opportunities.
There are always trade-offs when it comes to security
and our situation is no different. We want to reduce the
output size of a given hash function without compromising
the weak authentication scheme. A compromised scheme
would allow an attacker to quickly generate a large number
of arbitrary fragments that pass verification. The goal is
to make fragment forgeries as difficult as possible for an
adversary while keeping hash size small.
In our target scenario adversaries would attempt first
pre-image attacks1 in order to replace scraps of a valid
message. Given an n bit output hash a successful attack takes
2n operations. Using any cryptographically secure H() we
can construct a truncated hash function, Htr(), by simply
truncating the output of H() from n bits to ntr bits.
In practice, if we truncate the output of SHA-1 from
160-bits to 80-bits the level of pre-image security is 280,
a number generally recognized as being beyond the capa-
bilities of modern computing hardware. This allows us to
cut transmission overhead in half while still maintaining an
acceptable level of best-effort authentication. We will now
use the concept of truncated hashes to construct a simple
best-effort authentication scheme.
The “toilet paper” method, first proposed in the Delay-
Tolerant Networking Research Group mailing list, is a pro-
active approach to fragment authentication. Messages are
divided into scraps, i.e., individually authenticatable units.
Attached to each scrap is its corresponding digital signa-
ture. Intermediaries verify arbitrary scraps by verifying the
accompanying signature. The drawback to this approach
is the large overhead cost of sending and verifying O(n)
signatures.
To reduce this overhead we propose a “single-ply” toilet
paper approach based on truncated hashes. The sender com-
putes a truncated hash for each fragment, signs a list of all
hashes concatenated together, and attaches the signature to
1Given h, find m where H(m) = h
the original message. When an intermediate node fragments
the message it includes the hashes of all fragments not being
forwarded. This allows the receiving node to still verify
the signature by computing the hash values of received
fragments and combining with the hash values received. In
general, fragment verification requires knowing hash values
for all fragments not currently possessed. This results in the
worst case n− 1 auxiliary hash values.
We define our single-ply toilet paper approach formally
in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Single-Ply Toilet Paper: Sign
SIGN(M, sksign,⊥) :
SIG← ⊥
AUX ← ⊥
for i = 1 to n do
SIG← {SIG|Htr(fi)}
for j = 1 to n do
if j 6= i then
AUXi ← {AUXi|Htr(fj)}
end if
end for
end for
σs ← Ssksign(M)
σbf ← Ssksign(SIG)
return (σs, σbf , AUX)
Algorithm 4 Single-Ply Toilet Paper: Verify Scrap
V RFY SCRAP (fi, pksign, σbe, AUXi) :
SIG← ⊥
for j = 1 to n do
if j = i then
SIG← {SIG|Htr(fi)}
else
SIG← {SIG|AUXi,j}
end if
end for
return V ERIFY (SIG, pksign, σbe)
V. RELATED WORK
The goal of best-effort authentication is to reduce com-
putation and transmission overhead by relaxing the full
authentication assumption used in resource management
schemes. Although our focus is on related work in fragment
authentication we emphasize that best-effort authentication
is a general concept.
The fundamental problem behind fragment authentication
is how to establish that a given fragment (or set of frag-
ments) is part of an original authenticated message. The
following results provide strong authentication for individual
fragments:
Fragment authentication can be viewed as an instance
of the secure set membership problem: Given a set of
elements, S, provide a proof for an element si ∈ S that
any party can verify. Cryptographic accumulators combine
all elements of S into a single fixed-size accumulator and
generate a short witness for each si ∈ S. The witness can
be used to verify the membership status of si. A survey
of accumulator schemes can be found in [11]. Dynamic
accumulators, proposed by Camenish and Lysyanskaya [12],
allow elements to be added or removed without recomput-
ing over the entire set S. Both accumulator types, albeit
computationally expensive, are viable solutions for fragment
authentication in opportunistic networks.
There has been a number of results focusing on oppor-
tunistic environments. The Delay-Tolerant-Network (DTN)
security architecture draft [6] defines a straightforward toilet-
paper approach. A source host fragments a message and
attaches a digital signature, e.g, RSA, to each fragment.
This makes each fragment individually and independently
verifiable but incurs the overhead of O(n) signatures where
n is the total number of fragments.
Partridge [3] proposes cumulative authentication and func-
tion definitions. In the former, the main idea is to authen-
ticate a cumulative set of fragments instead of individual
fragments. An authenticator function outputs an authenti-
cator that is a function of all fragments up to fi, i.e.,
ai = A(f0, f1, ..., fi). This reduces computation when re-
ceiving contiguous sequences of data but requires fragments
to follow the same path.
Function definitions take an initialization vector,iv, and
fragment fi as inputs and output the fragment offset i:
A(iv, fi) = i. [3] shows how to construct A from traditional
hash functions. However, this requires a large iv and over-
head ends up being comparable to the toilet-paper approach.
Another approach is using Merkle Hash Trees (MHT)
as described in [7]. Messages are proactively divided into
fragments and the signed root of the corresponding MHT is
attached as the authentication token of the message. Senders
transmit fragments sequentially and include co-paths of any
fragments not yet received. When the communication link
is interrupted, the receiving node discards any partially
received fragments and uses the last valid co-path to verify
the remaining fragments.
To verify an individual fragment a sender must include the
hashes along the co-path to the root. Consider the example
shown in Figure 3. In order to verify f1 a receiver needs the
co-path hashes, identified as the circled nodes in the tree, to
correctly compute the root hash. If the computed hash does
not equal the signed root hash then the fragment is invalid.
Note that MHT transmission overheard amortizes nicely
when fragments are forwarded sequentially. For example, if
fragments f0 through f3 have been received then the co-path
for verifying f3 is a single hash: h4−7.
Figure 3. Merkle Hash Tree Computations
Another closely related area is authentication of streaming
data, where a source streams data that receivers authenti-
cate. Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
(TESLA)[13] is one approach where the sender computes a
message authentication code (MAC) over each packet using
keys from a one-way hash chain. The sender reveals the
key of period i during period i + 1. Delayed release of
keys requires: (1) receivers to buffer data and (2) loose time
synchronization. Key release based on time is not feasible
in opportunistic networks where contact link durations are
unknown.
Another approach includes simple hash chaining[14].
Packet i includes a hash of packet i + 1. A valid signature
over the first packet authenticates the entire chain. The
generalized approach in [15] includes multiple hashes/chains
to facilitate recovery when packets are lost. Unfortunately,
this does not help in situations where connections are lost
and cannot be restored.
The primary drawback of streaming data authentication is
the requirement for packets to be sent and verified sequen-
tially. Although, the generalized approach allows sending
from arbitrary points in the stream, it requires a large
overhead since first signed packet must contain hashes of
all subsequent packets. Both approaches are undesirable in
DTNs where intermediary fragments must be independently
verifiable and overhead needs to be kept low.
Finally, Son et al [16] propose a similar idea to re-
duce transmission overhead. The authors considering a sce-
nario messages have several multiple message authentica-
tion codes (MACs) attached. Bloom filters can be used to
combine the MACs and reduce transmission overhead. We
focus on fragmentation and discuss the security implications
of using Bloom filters in opportunistic networks.
VI. TRANSMISSION AND COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
In this section we give the transmission and computa-
tion overhead per message of both strong and best-effort
authentication constructions; total overhead in a network is
Notation Description
n Total number of scraps
σ Size of a secure signature
H Output size of strong hash
h Output size of truncated hash
p False Positive Rate
Table V
NOTATION
a multiple of per message overhead. Transmission overhead
is analyzed in terms of the increase in message size. We
follow the notation in Table V for the remainder of this
section.
We first analyze the transmission and computation over-
heads of traditional strong authentication schemes:
Toilet-paper: Total transmission overhead is one signature
per scrap: n ∗ σ. Total computation overhead is n signature
verifications.
Merkle Hash Tree: The transmission overhead depends on
the number of co-path hashes sent. If radio contact duration
over the opportunistic link is known a priori, then the exact
number of scraps and co-path hashes can be sent. In general,
contact durations are not known and nodes must interleave
scraps with co-path hashes. Table VI shows how the data in
Figure 3 is sent during each transmission over a single link.
Transmission cut after stage i means all fragments up to fi
are verifiable by the receiver.
Stage Data
1 f0, σ,H0−7, H1, H2−3, H4−7
2 f1
3 f2, H3
4 f3
5 f4, H5, H6−7
6 f5
7 f6, H7
8 f7
Table VI
FRAGMENT AUTHENTICATION DURING DATA TRANSMISSION
Total transmission overhead: σ+(n×H). The verification
overhead for a complete message is one signature verifica-
tion and 2n− 1 hashes to compute the full hash tree.
Spot checking: As described above, the spot checking
best-effort authentication technique reduces the computation
overhead of intermediate nodes by a factor 1 − p; it does
not affect the transmission overhead.
Truncated hashes: Using truncated hashes halves the
transmission overhead of hash values; it does not affect the
computation overhead of intermediate nodes.
Bloom filter: The transmission overhead depends on n, p,
and the number of hash functions, k. The exact size can be
computed as: m = 1− (1− p1/k)1/kn.
For comparison, we may want to fix m and compute the
corresponding p: p = (1− (1− 1m )kn)k
The verification overhead for a complete message is one
signature verification and k ∗ n hashes.
Example values: Assume a strong 1024-bit RSA signature,
SHA-1 (160 bit output) for H , and a message size of 5 MB
with 100 KB scraps. We now graph the total transmission
overhead (in bytes) of a Bloom filter as a function of p with
six values of k in Figure 4. This figure shows the overhead
savings that can be achieved when we vary the value of k
to achieve a desired p.
Please note that these savings are small relative to our
assumed scrap or message size. Therefore, in this case,
saving 600 bytes per message is unlikely to noticeably
increase delivery ratios. While not much is gained in our
target scenario, there may be situations where overhead is
important. As the ratio between scrap size and message size
decreases the importance of overhead increases.
In general, the savings in transmission time with best
effort authentication depend on the typical message size, the
false positives rate p and the technique used. (For example,
spot checking does not reduce transmission time). We have
shown that, independently of mobility model, significant
savings, as compared to MHT, are possible for certain mes-
sage size ranges and p values, when Bloom filter (best-effort)
authentication is used. Whether those message size ranges
are typical or not, depends on the use case. The savings of
best effort authentication are in (i) computation overhead and
(ii) transmission overhead. Both savings impact the battery
life of intermediary node.
Figure 4. Transmission overhead (with base 1024-RSA signatures) and
false positive rate of various Bloom filter k-values
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Adversarial Model: We assume the adversary is not a
domain member, but can record messages as a direct re-
cipient or by intercepting transmissions. The adversary does
not actively interfere with transmissions, e.g., by frequency
jamming. Finally, the adversary has no storage restrictions,
but can only perform a polynomial number of computations.
The goal of the adversary is to construct fragments that
intermediaries authenticate as belonging to domain mem-
bers. Forged fragments receive higher priority and improve
the personal delivery ratios of the adversary.
Harvesting Attacks: An adversary attempts to forge do-
main member fragments by harvesting legitimate messages
and attempting to impersonate them. The specific threat
from harvesting depends on the best-effort authentication
mechanism being used:
Spot checking used in conjunction with a strong authenti-
cation scheme does not increase the attack advantage if the
underlying cryptographic primitive is secure. The probability
of successfully delivering a forged fragment depends on
p and i, where i is the number of hops on the path
to the destination. If we assume, for simplicity, that all
intermediaries independently verify fragments with the same
probability2 1−p, then the probability of a successful attack
is pi.
Harvesting many signed Bloom filters can lead to an
offline pre-image attack. An attacker, who computes a
valid pre-image, can replace individual scraps of arbitrary
messages using the compromised Bloom filter. To limit the
damage from this attack we can include a random number
in the header as a unique message identifier and also hash
it into the Bloom filter. The random number (1) helps with
message reconstruction and (2) makes attacks more difficult
by binding the authentication token to a specific message.
This prevents an adversary from replaying the authentication
token in a later session. Unfortunately, it does not protect
messages that may have the same Bloom filter.
Colluding Adversary: A second scenario to consider is
one where the adversary colludes with the destination node:
an adversary uses harvested headers/signatures to send mes-
sages to the destination. To the network it will seem like
the messages are coming from a legitimate user and receive
priority treatment. Unfortunately, intermediaries can have
little impact in this situation since the end host is not
correctly verifying signatures. Bloom filters must be chosen
such that the amount of work needed to perform this attack
deters any potential colluders. If 1∗10−24 has a comparable
level of security to 2−80 then, based on Figure 4, we can set
k = 60 to achieve high security and reduced transmission
overhead at the expense of increased computation.
Denial-of-Service Attacks: We also want to consider the
possibility of various denial-of-service(DoS) attacks. One
approach is the fragment replacement attack, illustrated in
Figure 5, where an adversary prevents the forwarding of
valid message fragments. Consider a host S who has a mes-
sage destined for D. When S encounters intermediaries A
2In practice 1− p can be selected independently by each device.
and I1 it will forward fragments {a, b} and {a} respectively.
Now assume that A modifies fragment a to a′. If I2 accepts
the invalid fragment a′ from A, before communicating with
I1, it will not accept the valid fragment a. I2 believes it
has already received the correct fragment. If D receives an
invalid fragment, causing all valid fragments to be ignored,
then the original message will never be reconstructed. To
further clarify, we emphasize that fragment hashes are only
used for message reconstruction and not for any underlying
routing purposes.
Figure 5. Fragmentation Attack
To avoid this problem we require routing algorithms use
hashes when making forwarding decisions. This solves our
problem because fragments a and a′ hash to different values,
and thus, appear as distinct fragments. This pushes the re-
sponsibility of detecting invalid fragments to the destination.
The final issue we consider is an adversary who launches
a computational DoS attack by generating multiple invalid
fragments in hopes of overwhelming the destination. The
attacker exploits the fact that the destination must try all
possible combinations of fragments claiming to be the same
offset.
We can prevent this problem by attaching a signed list
of hashes to the original message. To reconstruct a message
the destination extracts and verifies the list. Using the list
of valid hashes the destination can easily discard invalid
fragments and prevent any computational DoS attacks.
Note that the above computational DoS attack is only
possible when an adversary is capable of producing a large
number of invalid fragments efficiently. This is only possible
when, e.g., Bloom filter parameters are such that the false-
positive probability is high. If p ≤ 2−80 this attack is not
possible.
VIII. ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS
We have shown an opportunistic networking scenario
that does not require strong authentication of messages by
intermediate nodes. As another potential application of best-
effort authentication, consider the PKI based system pro-
posed in [7], where messages are encrypted using short-lived
certificates. Problems arise when users are disconnected
from the network when their short-lived certificate expires.
Disconnected users, unable to retrieve new certificates, are
revoked from the system and unable to send new messages.
Sending messages under expired keys only results in them
being immediately discarded by intermediaries.
However, intermediaries using best-effort authentication
can accept messages (with expired certificates) without
negatively impacting delivery ratios. Recently expired cer-
tificates, unlikely to be malicious, are likely to be close to
their final destination. Intermediaries not overloaded may
decide to tolerate the message for possible forwarding.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of fragmen-
tation on the effectiveness of resource management schemes
in the ad-hoc opportunistic network scenario of [1]. We
found that in our scenario fragmentation alone is insufficient
and must be coupled with fragment authentication schemes
to both optimize and protect network resources.
We also observed that strong security guarantees are not
required for messages conveyed by intermediate nodes in
our opportunistic networking scenario. Benefits of resource
management techniques can be retained using “best-effort”
authentication mechanisms. With this knowledge, oppor-
tunistic network designers can determine how to trade-
off between strong cryptographic guarantees and improved
delivery ratios through decreased transmission overhead.
We speculate that the notion of best-effort authentication
may also be relevant in other scenarios, although a careful
security analysis is needed for each specific case.
Finally, we described and analyzed two publicly verifiable
best-effort authentication methods. We discussed transmis-
sion overhead of each and have shown their respective
improvements over strong authentication mechanisms.
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